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The aim of this article is to shed some light on certain points of Hermogenes’ 
work On Staseis. These points, in my opinion, show that behind the practical 
orientation of the rhetorical theory of this work, rhetoric emerges as a 
philosophy of law. 
The most basic new feature in Hermogenes’ treatment of the subject of 
stasis is the full-scale adoption of the method of division1 which pertains to 
the whole system. Through a series of dichotomies he connects the different 
staseis and creates a subordinating system in which 12 staseis derive from their 
previous ones and ultimately from the first stasis of conjecture.2 Hermagoras’ 
system was, as far as we can tell, a coordinating system, and his four main 
staseis were placed on the same level.3 Hermogenes also proceeds to the 
division of each stasis into kephalaia, heads of arguments, which constitute 
the basis for a full exposition of legal arguments in a dispute. This method 
of division, via which Hermogenes moves downwards step by step until he 
pinpoints the relevant stasis for any given case, is regarded as bearing traces 
of a Stoic influence, while the general approach to the basic four traditional 
staseis is considered as following Aristotle’s list of four judgments.4 At the 
1  See the remark (at the very beginning of the first chapter of his work On Staseis) that there are many 
important elements which constitute rhetoric, and that the most important of them is what has to do with 
division and demonstration. Hermogenes seems to imply that demonstration without division is unthinkable. 
He explains that he does not mean either the division of rhetoric into its genres or the division of a speech 
into its parts, and continues: ‘The present discussion deals with the division of political questions (politika 
zetemata) into what are known as heads (kephalaia). This subject is almost identical with the theory of 
invention, except that it does not include all the elements of invention’. The translation is that of Heath. 
See Heath 1995. If I do not mention the origin of the translation, then the translation is my own. That the 
method of division must be carefully applied so that it will result in correct divisions is clearly stated (see 
68. 2–4). At the same time, when Hermogenes proceeds to a wider explanatory discussion, he feels the need 
to clarify that at this point he does not follow the principle of division: ‘We have made these comments not 
as a division… but just so as to indicate the nature of the heads’ (67. 20–1); see also 81. 15–16; 86. 15–17. 
2  See Lindberg 1997, 1979–2021, cf. 1991. See also Heath 1995, 71; Kennedy 1994, 209–11; Kennedy 
1983, 83.
3 Hermagoras is generally regarded as the father of the system; see Lindberg 1997, 1991; Nadeau 1959, 
52–71, cf. 67. Mathes 1958, 58–204, cf. 165. The basic four-part system of staseis attributed to Hermagoras 
(which Hermogenes incorporated into his own) included: stochasmos, conjecture (about the facts: did it 
happen in fact?), horos, definition (there is an agreement that something happened, but how can we define 
the act?), poiotes, quality (the examination is about the quality of the act: is it just, good, etc?), metalepsis, 
objection (objections of a procedural character: is the case judged by the right person, at the right time, etc?).
4 See Aristotle, Topics 100a20–02b26. See also Jaeneke 1904, 27–78; Nadeau 1959, 67; Nadeau 1959a, 
248–54; Lindberg 1997, 1991.
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same time, however, one cannot deny that above all Hermogenes’ system 
‘represents a practical approach, useful for the student who has just chosen a 
case on which to produce a declamation’, as Lindberg has put it.5 
Hermogenes makes clear from the beginning of his introduction that his 
discussion is concerned with the division of ‘political questions’ into ‘heads of 
arguments’. It is obvious from the definition of ‘political question’, as well as 
from the explanations he gives and the nature of the examples he adduces, that 
his thoughts are focused on judicial rhetoric, while the deliberative rhetoric – 
which is supposed to be also covered by this theory – has only a very limited 
role in the system. The first step is to explain what a ‘political question’ 
is: ‘It is a logical dispute on a particular matter which is arising under the 
established laws or customs of any given society and is concerned with what 
is considered to be just, with what is honourable, what is advantageous, or all 
of these together or some of them’ (29. 1–4). Immediately after this he points 
out that ‘it is not the function of rhetoric to investigate what is in reality and 
universally honourable or advantageous or things like these’. 
Hermogenes does not mention philosophy here, but when he makes 
the distinction between the particular and the general, the specific and 
the universal, in connection with his discussion of rhetoric, he implicitly 
differentiates philosophy from rhetoric. Philosophy addresses theoretical 
issues and seeks what is just, honourable, and advantageous in a universal 
sense. Rhetoric obviously deals with the particular case at hand; but what does 
it mean when Hermogenes says that it is not rhetoric’s function to investigate 
these (or other similar) topics in general terms? Hermogenes, in my opinion, 
does not attribute this function to philosophy alone in this statement. Rhetoric 
also deals with theoretical and general questions in various cases and one such 
case appears in the course rhetoric follows when educating young orators. 
The most advanced preliminary exercises (progymnasmata)6 included the 
thesis, where one had to support or refute a general position, e.g. whether 
one should teach rhetoric or whether there are many worlds. The next step for 
the student was to deal with a hypothesis,7 in which concrete circumstances 
were specified (e.g. whether Aristotle should teach rhetoric in the Academy) 
and which, for that reason, was regarded as more difficult. Moreover, in his 
discussion on the staseis later on, Hermogenes includes thesis as a head of an 
argument in which the particular case is supported on the basis of a general 
principle.8 Thus, it seems that what Hermogenes means is that rhetoric does 
5 Lindberg 1997, 1991 and n. 91.
6 See Kennedy 1994, 202–07; Kennedy 2003; Heath 2003, 129–60. 
7 On thesis and its relation to hypothesis see Thorm 1932; Matthes 1958, 123–32; Heath 1995, 18.
8 See e.g. On Staseis 49. 15–19; 67. 13–17.
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not regard the theoretical discussions on general subjects as its main task, as 
an end in itself, but that it deals with them as far as they are practically useful 
for defending a particular case either in education or in actual disputes. 
This well-known focus of rhetoric on the particular cases is stressed here in 
connection with special reference to law and justice. The specific dispute that 
rhetoric has to settle arises in the context of a certain society which functions on 
the basis of its own laws and customs. This dispute is about what is considered 
just, about what is honourable, etc. Hermogenes does not speak of ‘what is just’ 
(as he does in the case of the honourable and the advantageous), but of ‘what 
is considered to be just’, which is equivalent to ‘what the enacted laws regard 
as just’, as some of his scholiasts also assert.9 At the same time, Hermogenes 
does not explicitly include ‘the just’ in the list of topics that are not investigated 
in general terms by rhetoric.10 It is obvious that, when mentioning ‘what is 
regarded as just’, Hermogenes makes a distinction between law and ‘what is 
really just’. He also seems to accept that, when we speak of the honourable 
and the advantageous, the general background against which they are judged 
in each particular case is that of the society’s laws and customs, whilst in the 
case of ‘the just’ this general background appears to be threefold: that of the 
customs, that of the enacted laws and that of a more general investigation about 
justice, i.e. the one that allows the orator to refer to universal law or the law of 
nature. Since Aristotle himself had left open the possibility that an orator could 
take refuge in the notion of universal law, given that the laws of the city were 
against his case,11 we are entitled to suppose that Hermogenes’ intention here 
was not to deprive the orators of such a possibility, as his scholiast seems to 
believe.12 Besides, some of the nomikai staseis, e.g. (see rheton kai dianoia, 
letter and intent or syllogismos, assimilation) are possible exactly because a 
more general interpretation of law is possible.
If we accept the previous interpretation of Hermogenes’ words in his 
definition of ‘political question’, then the interplay between the general and 
the particular becomes more prominent in the case of judicial rhetoric, because 
it may seek its arguments (pro et contra) outside the field of established laws 
9 Walz, 1833; see 74 for the scholia of Syrianus and 80 for the similar ones of Sopatrus.
10 One could argue that ta toiauta, things like these, include also ‘the just’, but we cannot ignore the fact 
that Hermogenes avoids mentioning it explicitly.
11 See Aristotle Rhetoric I 13, 1373b2–18.
12 In his scholia to Hermogenes’ On Staseis Sopatrus writes that what is just in a city is defined on the basis 
of law and asserts that ‘the orators do not follow what is just by nature, but the just enacted by law; but 
philosophers deal with the former; for what has prevailed by law (in a given city) is not necessarily in accord 
with what is just by nature’. See Walz 1833, 80. Sopatrus accepts that Hermogenes makes the distinction 
between what is just by nature (law of nature) and what is just by convention (enacted law). This distinction 
(in a political context) goes back to Aristotle; on this distinction and the possibly different meaning of 
‘natural right’ in Aristotle from the meaning the term took later in the Stoics see Johnston 2011, 78 ff.
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or customs, where the dispute arose, in the more general sphere of what is 
universally right. In rhetoric, however, as Hermogenes seems to accept in 
his discussion about persons and acts, the probative value of an argument 
is directly proportional to its degree of concreteness and specificity. This 
is the reason why determinate proper names, for example, have greater 
argumentative force than simple appellative terms, such as general, politician, 
etc.13 This means that the rhetorical arguments gradually lose their force as 
they become more and more general, and they move away from the particular 
case under investigation. At the same time, however, Hermogenes does not 
fail to add that one ‘should assess the force of each and use it as occasion 
allows’. By this position he confirms that particular instances govern rhetorical 
argumentation, and that the particular case is the beginning and the end of any 
rhetorical theory. At the same time he mitigates the rigidity of his own rule 
and appears to advocate the rather relativist position that the probative value 
of the general and/or the particular cannot be absolutely fixed by any rule and 
that it ultimately depends on the occasion. But, if this is the case, then, what is 
the place of stasis theory in this interplay between the general and the specific, 
the universal and the particular? Besides, what is the place of law in this stasis 
system, given that the application of the law encounters similar problems (see 
e.g. the connection between a general law and a particular case)? 
Hermogenes believes that the method of division can answer these 
questions. It is his conviction that division can solve the problem of rhetoric’s 
scientific approach to its subject. I think that this conviction of his (irrespective 
of the influences one can discern in his practical application of the method) 
could be the result of a rather direct Platonic influence. Plato believes that it 
is only through dialectic, and especially through its branch of division, that 
the person who aspires to become an orator can proceed in an artful way and 
become a successful orator.14 The fact that division is the sole method used in 
On Staseis, as well as some explicit relevant statements of Hermogenes make 
it clear, in my opinion, that he shares this Platonic conviction.15
Hermogenes does not apply division to the greatest matter of rhetoric, i.e. 
13 See On Staseis, 29. 17–30, 9.
14 See Pl. Phaedrus 271C–72B.
15 See n. 1 above. Compare also, for example, Phaedrus 266B ‘Believe me, Phaedrus, I am myself a 
lover of these divisions and collections, that I may gain the power to speak and to think…’ and On Staseis 
35. 2–5 ‘but it is of course impossible for anyone who has not yet studied the pure division of questions 
into the so-called heads, or who is unfamiliar with what are known as the issues of problems (i.e. staseis, 
which are again a product of divisions) to have a sound grasp of the things I have just mentioned’ (Heath’s 
translation). Or, again Plato’s warning against unnatural or incorrect divisions which is also found in 
Hermogenes; see Phaedrus 265E and On Staseis 35. 15–17. For Platonic influence on Hermogenes more 
generally see Wooten 1987, 131; North 1991, 201–19, cf. 216–18.  
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soul, as Plato demands, but he follows the tradition of rhetoric in this respect. 
In this tradition the orator used to form only a rough empirical idea about the 
‘type or types of soul’ in the audience and was mainly concerned with the 
content of the speech and the way of presentation which were regarded as the 
main producers of persuasion. Moreover, in judicial oratory of the 2nd century 
AD, when the law system imposed stronger limitations on the members of a 
jury than in Classical times, discerning types of soul in this body of judges was 
not essential and what counted most was undoubtedly the quality of the legal 
arguments – under the condition of course that the judges were allowed to 
decide according to the law without any external pressure. Thus, Hermogenes 
had to use the method of division in order to construct a system that could help 
the orators pinpoint the subject with precision and find out the most relevant, 
strong and persuasive arguments in a given political and legal context. 
The problem Hermogenes encountered was related to the nature of 
rhetorical subjects. He had to deal with a vast number of particular (practically 
uncountable) instances which could possibly become subjects of rhetorical 
investigation and declamation. First, he gathers all these particulars under 
the general term politikon zetema, political question. The division, however, 
which follows, cannot lead to a certain particular that is practically unknown 
in a theoretical examination of this kind. But even if it were known, a division 
that could lead to a full definition of the particular case by enumerating all 
the inherent characteristics that connect it to the general category would be of 
little practical use, since it could lack reference to the wider social, political, 
and legal contexts, and, besides, it would require a new theory of pinpointing 
particular arguments for or against. The solution to this problem was twofold. 
First, various criteria related to social context were used as a basis for the 
divisions employed and, secondly, the divisions did not end in a particular 
case, but in what was called kephalaia, or heads of arguments. The heads of 
arguments are also general notions with a certain degree of abstractness, but 
Hermogenes tries to show that dividing a ‘political question’ into its staseis, 
and each stasis into kephalaia, is the best way to approach theoretically a 
particular case and relate the heads of arguments to the specific demands of 
this case.
Before proceeding to the division of a ‘political question’ into staseis, 
Hermogenes makes some preliminary clarifications which he regards as 
necessary for a clear understanding of the divisions of questions into heads. 
One such preliminary but basic division is that of ‘political questions’ into 
synestota, those that are capable of stasis (they have an issue) and can be 
divided into heads, and asystata, asystatic questions, those that are not capable 
of stasis (they do not have issue). To these basic groups he also adds a third 
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group consisting of questions that are close to being asystata, near asystatic, 
(they are almost lacking issue).16 Hermogenes enumerates the conditions 
that a ‘political question’ must satisfy in order to be capable of stasis, i.e. 
in order to be a possible subject of a rhetorical investigation/declamation.17 
In this connection it is important to note the new points which Hermogenes 
seems to have introduced into the system. He brings forward eight types 
of asystatic questions: one-sided, wholly	 equivalent, reversible, insoluble, 
implausible, impossible, disreputable, uncircumstantial. If the reconstruction 
of Hermagoras’ system is correct,18 then he had provided four asystatic 
questions: deficient, one-sided, wholly equivalent, insoluble. Hermogenes’ 
innovation includes not only the addition of four more types, but also the 
enrichment of the criteria employed in this division. He changed the first part 
of the list of asystatic questions by adding the reversible and taking away the 
deficient	(one-sided, wholly	equivalent, reversible, insoluble). Then he formed 
the second part of the list by adding the rest of them (implausible, impossible, 
disreputable, uncircumstantial) and absorbing the deficient into what he called 
aperistaton, uncircumstantial. It is true that the first half of the list includes 
asystatic questions which can be easily justified by reference to their lack of 
compliance with the conditions prescribed.19 The addition of the new four 
types, however, created some problems with classification and this is the main 
reason why Hermogenes’ treatment of asystatic questions has been regarded 
as an unsatisfactory ‘body of theory’.20 What is a problem from a clearly 
theoretical point of view, however, becomes an advantage when seen from 
the point of view of a practically oriented classification. Hermogenes’ criteria 
are in fact concerned in part with the resources offered for argumentation 
and in part with the potential conclusion.21 The first four types, however, 
seem to focus more on the lack of arguments that results from the specific 
circumstances of the case at hand, while in the four last asystatic questions the 
focus is more on the wider social context, which plays a significant role in the 
invalidation of the argumentation. In Hermogenes’ examples, the implausible 
question (Aristides acts unjustly), for example, is invalid not because Aristides 
16 On Staseis 31. 19–34, 15.
17 See the relevant discussion in Heath 1995, 66–70. The conditions mentioned (31, 19–32, 9) are the 
following: (i) The questions include person and act or one of them, (ii) There are persuasive arguments 
on both sides that (a) are different from those of the other party, and (b) have probative force, and (iii) 
the verdict (which is to be pronounced by the jury) is (a) not self evident, (b) not prejudiced, and (c) not 
unreachable.   
18 Nadeau 1959, 66–71. 
19 See n. 17 above.
20 See the discussion in Heath 1995, 67.
21 Heath 1995, ibid.
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could not have proceeded to an unjust act under certain circumstances, but 
because people cannot be persuaded that such a man proceeded to such an 
act.22 The term used for the last asystatic question, uncircumstantial, denotes 
the absence not only of more general circumstances but also of necessary 
particular circumstances that could give rise to relevant arguments and result 
in a resolution being reached. The fact that Hermogenes abandons the term 
deficient and uses the broader term, aperistaton, uncircumstantial (if he was 
the one who originally introduced the term) illustrates, I think, the point of 
view from which he approached the matter of asystatic questions.  He seems 
to point out the power of society’s convictions as to what is implausible, 
impossible, or disreputable and the impact of these convictions on the 
validation or invalidation of relevant arguments. Moreover, the introduction 
of these new asystatic questions (as well as that of the near asystatic ones) in 
this period, when law literature was increasing23 and a systematic exposition 
of the elements of Roman law appeared,24 could probably be the rhetorician’s 
reaction to the new developments in the field of law.25 It would be catastrophic 
for a professional orator, an advocatus, if he did not recognize the asystatic 
nature of a question and tried to build arguments, for or against the case at 
hand, which would ignore the peculiarity of the situation. 
Hermogenes’ major division is of course that which discerns the staseis 
and their relation to each other. He applies the method of division, as it was 
introduced by Plato, as faithfully as he can.26 He starts from the general 
class politikon zetema and then, taking as his basis the possible nature of the 
krinomenon, the subject which is being examined, he devises a division of 
the whole class into two mutually exclusive sub-classes; these sub-classes 
are distinguished by the fact that one possesses a certain characteristic while 
the other lacks it. Then he repeats the procedure by dividing the sub-class 
which possesses the characteristic (in a tree-like representation it would be 
on the right) in the same way into two parts, and so on. The sub-class or any 
subdivision which does not permit further division (in principle the ones to the 
22 The difference between implausible and impossible is clear I think. The impossible refers to cases which 
simply, according to reason or common belief, do not exist. For a rather different view see Heath 1995, 67.
23 Emmett 2008, 114–62, cf. 118–19.
24 See Muirhead 1880. 
25 This point obviously needs further investigation, but there is evidence for other changes in rhetorical 
theory which seem to have been introduced as a consequence of the rhetoricians’ need to adapt their theory 
to contemporary court practice. See Heath 2003a, 1–91, cf. 19–23.    
26 Plato elaborates on his method of division in the Sophist and the Statesman. See cf. the Sophist 
218D–237A.
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left) constitutes the staseis of a politikon zetema.27 In this way he distinguishes 
13 staseis.28 
The whole system of staseis represents the structure of social reality and the 
place of law within it, as it is understood by a rhetorician. Above everything 
there is the level of existence (stochasmos) and then the rest (of the levels) 
dependent on it follow: that of placing something that exists in a class (horos) 
in order for men to understand it and be certain that they speak of the same 
thing; that of the qualities of the thing under discussion (poiotes), which are 
understood as either inherent to it in some way (logike) or as imposed on 
it by a legal provision (nomike). From that point onwards, reality becomes 
the very concrete one of the law courts. With the exception of pragmatike,29 
all the divisions and subdivisions of logike try to put the complex net of 
intentions and subjective understanding that covers the human acts into some 
order. They bring together into one system various manifestations of a basic 
human tendency that gives rise to various argument strategies or, from another 
point of view, a tendency that sheds more light on the acts that are under 
legal investigation. It is the psychological tendency which tries to give moral 
content to a bad act through the belief that the victim deserved the punishment, 
that somebody else bears the responsibility for one’s deeds, or that the wrong 
act was a departure point for great benefit. The final point of this course is the 
stasis of syngnome, where the accused asks for forgiveness and practically 
employs his last argument by addressing his fellow man’s feelings of pity and 
expecting the punishment to be mitigated. On the other hand, the division of 
nomike does not follow the pattern of successive subdivisions into two parts 
anymore, but is directly divided into four staseis (or five if we also count the 
metalepsis here, which is first added at the end as if it is outside the system, 
27 The lack of space does not allow me to present a diagram here. For an excellent diagram showing 
the whole system of Hermogenes’ division with the branches leading to the right see Kennedy 1983, 83. 
Phanes, however (in the first division) and teles (in the second one) should be corrected to phaneron and 
teleion respectively. 
28 Kennedy counts 14 staseis in his diagram. In the same way many later Greek commentators count 14 
staseis in Hermogenes’ system. Marcellinus, however, in his Prolegomena counts 13, because of the double 
meaning of metalepsis, objection (documentary and non documentary). See also Kennedy 1994, 210, n. 
14. Hermogenes keeps the four basic staseis (stochasmos, horos, poiotes, metalepsis, see n. 3 above), but 
divides poiotes into two parts: logike, rational, and nomike, legal, and by subdividing both successively 
he brings forward the following staseis (in the order he treats them): antilepsis, antistasis, antenglema, 
metastasis, syngnome, pragmatike, rheton and dianoia, syllogismos, antinomia, amphibolia.
29 The only exception is the mention of pragmatike. Logike is divided into two branches on the basis of 
whether the subject which it deals with refers to the future or the past: if it refers to the future, the stasis is 
the pragmatike which is related to the deliberative genre; if it refers to the past, then we have dikaiologia, 
related to judicial rhetoric, which is not a stasis, since it is further subdivided.   
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and then treated separately).30 The nomikai staseis actually comprise a rather 
exhaustive list of cases of legal argumentation, which is practically nothing 
but various cases of law interpretation. For the rhetoricians, law could not 
be simply applied without further discussion. Aristotle had already observed 
that the laws are necessarily expressed in general terms and because of that 
they apply to broad classes of deeds and wide groups of individuals.31 It is 
the judge, according to Aristotle, who will link the general provisions of law 
with the particular case at hand. But the rhetoricians never left this role to the 
official judges alone, and the interpretation of law was always a useful weapon 
when trying to defend their cases or when helping the judge dispense justice.
Through the system of staseis rhetoric recognizes that nothing can be 
certain or known beyond any doubt in social reality, that change predominates, 
and that everything has to be established in each case from the beginning, 
irrespective of the existing legal system. The laws which are an established 
and stable point of reference cannot be the point of departure in the process 
of administering justice. Moreover, the stasis system allows rhetoric to 
move effectively between the general and the particular, and helps justice 
administration to bridge the gap between the general law and the particular 
case. Consequently, Hermogenes’ hierarchical system illustrates the steps 
which should be followed not only by the student of rhetoric who wants to be 
successful in his declamation, but also by the orator or judge who in practice 
tries to find out the truth behind a particular case and dispense justice.  
30 See on metalepsis On Staseis 42. 10–43, 7 and 79. 19–82, 3. The four staseis mentioned here are: rheton 
and dianoia, syllogismos, antinomia, amphibolia. See also n. 3 above about metalepsis.
31 Aristotle Rhetoric I 1, 1354a12–b22.
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